Cocaine: The thread connecting Latin America and the Caribbean to Europe

By Mabel González Bustelo

English translation by Yenni Castro (Valestra Editorial)

Global drug markets, controlled by organized crime groups, are constantly adapting to generate new consumer products, new markets, new routes and means of transport, and even a constant renewal of the actors involved in the business. Within this complex and fluctuating panorama, cocaine -its production, trafficking, and consumption- from cultivation areas to markets, is the chain that cements the relationships between organized crime in the Latin American and Caribbean region and Europe.

The UN's annual report on organized crime and drugs for 2024 shows a record production of more than 2,700 tons of pure cocaine in the Andean region. Last year, approximately 23.5 million people worldwide consumed this product, primarily in the US, Western Europe, and Central Europe markets.

The origins of the links between Latin American and European criminal networks can be traced back to the 1980s, when the major Colombian groups found that their sea and air routes through the Caribbean to the US were intercepted. It was then that they began to rely more heavily on Mexican groups, which until then were focused on marijuana. Payment for transport services was replaced by payment for the product (up to 50% of the shipment). As a result, Mexican networks strengthened their control of the northern border, and Colombians ended up becoming their suppliers.

With trade to the US controlled from Mexico, Colombian and other groups turned their attention to a smaller but growing European market, offering higher prices and perceived lower risks. In 2009, Europe accounted for half of these groups' total profits, and since then, the market has continued to grow, along with the number of players involved.

If the U.S. market is controlled by Mexicans, in Europe, those with the right contacts, money, and business knowledge can enter a much more open market.

In addition, following the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the global cocaine market has continued to expand, with markets opening up in Africa, Asia, and Oceania, where major interdiction operations have recently been carried out.

Global expansion

All the cocaine that enters Europe supplies its markets, but much of it does not stay there. A modern transport infrastructure connects the continent to multiple parts of the globe and makes it a platform for distributing drugs to emerging Asian markets, from the Balkans to Russia and China, Malaysia, or Australia, among others.

All of this has been accompanied by a relentless adaptation in the modes of transport, routes, and means used. At sea, they have focused on moving cocaine among the millions of legal containers that reach the European market annually, but they also use ocean-going vessels from which transfers are made on the high seas. In addition, they use commercial and charter flights, and narco-submarines have been found near European shores.

To avoid transporting the product through the most heavily guarded areas, they have diversified their outbound routes to Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Chile, among others. In Europe, the key destinations are large ports such as Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Hamburg, which have immense cargo traffic and are well-connected by land transport infrastructure with the entire continent. To diversify risks, they also use secondary ports with less scrutiny.

The current boom in production, combined with rising consumption, has created a market that needs to be supplied on a regular basis. Latin American and European groups work closely together. But every change in the business affects the relative power of each group. The routes that cross Brazil, for example, have allowed Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC, originally a group of prisoners) to become a transnational player.

Innovations

The EUROPOL Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2025 (EU-SOCTA) report (published every 4 years) considers that this trade will continue to be a threat in the coming years due to the agile and sophisticated use of new production methods, technologies, investment structures in the legal economy and the increasing use of online tools and artificial intelligence.

Among the main trends, they highlight: 

• Diversification of the routes and modus operandi of the groups.
• Constantly changing departure and arrival ports.
• To avoid interception of large shipments, some groups opt for smaller, more discreet operations, spreading the cargo across different entry points, containers, and other vessels.
• Some continue to transport the final product (cocaine hydrochloride), while others prefer to move the base paste, which is then finished in laboratories in the EU itself, especially in the west and south.

The structures

A key aspect is the configuration of the groups operating in this business. Years ago, Colombian cartels gave rise to fragmented, invisible, horizontal structures that operate using a network model (cells and nodes).

In contrast to the hierarchical nature of past groups (Medellín, Cali, and later ones in Mexico), efforts to evade police pressure and reinforce the security of operations have generated modular, horizontal, interconnected networks with multiple nodes, and extremely discreet. These networks have multiple decentralized nodes, which know little of the overall network configuration, and whose arrests do not disrupt the system (hey can be easily replaced). Sometimes, an individual is the only point of contact between cells. Some brokers or negotiators are key players.

Arresting a boss does not mean the end of the network. On the contrary, it can increase violence by generating fragmentation within groups and fostering competition among them.

Networks share resources, facilitate contacts, and coordinate their activities at different points. Several networks may create the equivalent of "investment funds" to finance large operations and use redundant pools of specialized transporters. At the same time, they delegate complex operations such as money laundering and the use of violence to others. Having multiple actors available at every step of the supply chain is key to reducing harm.

More difficulties in fighting crime

The EUROPOL report mentions the use of highly advanced encrypted systems for their communications, as well as Artificial Intelligence to plan operations. This makes them even more dangerous and difficult to combat. 

When Narcotráfico y crimen organizado. ¿Hay alternativas? [Narcotrafficking and Organized Crime - Are There Alternatives?] was published in 2014, the trend towards decentralization was already apparent and we wondered about the effectiveness of different approaches in the fight against drugs. Faced with a business model driven by astronomical profits - where each border crossed adds more profits - we verified an astonishing capacity for adaptation and the transformation from hierarchies to networks.  None of the then-prevailing approaches in the fight against drugs could show resounding successes.

Now, according to Europol, "in this democratic, decentralized and multinational underworld, criminal networks involved in cocaine trafficking are multiplying on both continents, both Latin America and Europe”.

Dismantling these networks is not easy; their borders are fluid, and if their leaders are arrested, they can continue to command from prison or are quickly replaced. Some of them, as EU-SOCTA notes, have been active for more than 10 years despite the efforts of law enforcement agencies.

Meanwhile, the UNODC report calls for a shift in priorities among security agencies, to reduce efforts on the weakest links and target the places where the big money is. At the same time, it recommends economic alternatives for those who depend on the drug trade, whether they are farmers or young people without opportunities, targeting the root causes of poverty, unemployment, and insecurity.

But in the face of this, harsh trends are emerging. The NGO InSight Crime denounces that the Trump Administration, with the virtual disappearance of USAID and the restructuring of the State Department, will leave important anti-drug programs in Mexico and Colombia without funding, including those related to the 2016 peace process in Colombia, and the fight against money laundering.

For its part, the EU-SOCTA report warns that whatever the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war, there will be serious risks, ranging from the proliferation of the massive quantities of weapons available in that context to the economic difficulties faced by demobilized fighters, which could lead them into organized crime and other networks. This is not the first time this has occurred in conflict zones, but it could have a significant impact on the European and global criminal landscape.  

About the author

Mabel González Bustelo is a senior peace and security analyst. Member of the Ibero-American Network of Women Mediators. Member of the Board of Directors of IECAH. She has been a senior researcher at the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF). She is a consultant to governments and international institutions on issues of mediation and political dialogue.

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