Defense in the China-LAC relationship

By Xulio Ríos

English translation by Yenni Castro (Valestra Editorial)

Cooperation between China and Latin American countries focuses on economics and trade. Latin America is rich in resources and China sees Latin America as an important component of its strategy, a key region for the development of its foreign relations. Likewise, for many Latin American countries, China is a top-tier trading partner[1] . China actively invests in multiple sectors of Latin American industry and the development of military connections complements its broad strategy. Therefore, China considers military cooperation an important area for the development of relations with its strategic partners.

Over the last few lustrums, the US has paid more attention to other regions of the planet. This has facilitated China's increased presence and influence in LAC. However, Washington is very sensitive to China's military presence in Latin America and pays special attention to each of its movements in the region. China used to be particularly cautious in promoting cooperation with Latin American countries regarding defense matters. Today, the reality is different and more plausible progress can be seen. China's strategy evidences an increasingly clear roadmap to compete for international power and prominence with the US.

China is developing bilateral relations with those countries in the region with which it has established diplomatic relations (not all of them, due to the persistence of the Taiwan issue). In addition, it has a multilateral platform, the China-Latin America Defence Forum, one of the emblematic mechanisms for developing military relations. This was born out of the China-CELAC Forum (China and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States forum), formed in 2014. Its objectives are the usual ones in these initiatives: to strengthen unity and cooperation, to do more for peace and stability, to build communication and trust, and to manage risks and challenges.

Latin American and Caribbean countries are increasingly seeing China as a balancing alternative to the relationship with the US. This consideration allows China to gradually improve its relations. Latin American militaries, beyond ideological positions, perceive bonds with China as an alternative that is potentially convenient.  In this sense, they identify additional opportunities to develop interactions with Chinese partners. In addition, China generally sides with these countries in conflicts and claims where the US and other powers have turned their backs (e.g. Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas).

The contents of an ascending relationship

There are four main axes:

1. Statements undermining Washington's strategic preeminence.

2. Cooperation in strategic areas.

3. Military transactions, and

4. The elements shaping the Sino-Latin American military relationship are military equipment and weaponry.

Certain specific issues can also be mentioned, such as China's interest in the administration of the Panama Canal port facilities with an eye on bioceanic maritime traffic and the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Haiti, which are part of a larger strategy.[2]

With respect to the pronouncements that affect Washington's strategic-narrative preeminence, indications can be seen in the visits of military authorities to countries such as Venezuela, Cuba or Bolivia, as well as Brazil, among others, in which the similarities among their positions regarding the defense of the strategic alliance, the approach to certain conflicts of global scope or the exaltation of the prevalence of national interests against what they describe as “U.S. hegemonism” can be observed.

As for cooperation in strategic areas, it is basically focused on the exchange of technology and intelligence. In the first aspect, the projects agreed with Argentina (in terms of satellites and nuclear energy) and Brazil (satellites and shipbuilding) stand out. Also, regarding Venezuela, the acquisition of Chinese radar and satellite communication equipment is worth mentioning.

Regarding intelligence, there has been speculation about the eventual use by the People's Republic of the spy stations in Lourdes and Bejucal (Cuba) that were built by the now defunct Soviet Union. Havana has categorically denied this. China, on the other hand, may be interested in closely following the conduct of Taiwanese diplomacy in the region. The counterpart that may be of interest to the Latin American side is related to the establishment of Chinese mafias.

In terms of military exchanges, high-level visits are a recognized practice. It is worth mentioning the attendance to training courses offered by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Beijing, and seminars that include visits to military units and schools. In these events, the Chinese vision of the international system is disseminated.

Visits to Chinese ports by Latin American naval units or vice versa are also relevant. Fleets of the PLA Navy have visited different countries in the region. Likewise, the hospital ship Peace Ark of the PLA Navy, which provides medical services in the countries it visits, promotes initiatives such as the “Mission Harmony”, which contribute to improve its image.

The list of elements that give content to the military linkages concludes with the donation or sale of military equipment and weaponry. It is here where the US could feel the material impact of China's involvement in the region the most, since it could reduce the scope of its monopoly and condition its hemispheric primacy in the future. However, although China supplies arms to a wide variety of Latin American states (from Brazil to Uruguay, including Colombia and Venezuela, among others), it is far from being a problem. What it sells most is equipment and not so much weaponry.

In view of these contents, it can be inferred that they are not particularly relevant today.

Leap still in progress

The favorable tone of China's relationship with some countries in the region warns of a qualitative leap in progress. This is the case, for example, of Brazil, a partner of no lesser importance, which aspires to structure a collaboration with China that goes beyond the strictly bilateral[3] .

In any case, defense cooperation can only continue to expand.

About the Author

Xulio Ríos is an emeritus advisor to the Observatory of China Policy and Casa Asia. Winner of the Cátedra China and Casa Asia awards, he is the author of more than a dozen titles on China. Professor and consultant for several university institutions in Spain, China, and Latin America, and a member of scientific councils and editorial committees of several sinological publications.

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[1] For an overview (2019), please visit: https://www.fundacioncarolina.es/catalogo/el-estado-de-las-relaciones-china-america-latina/

[2]Although Haiti has not yet established diplomatic relations with China, the Asian country voted in favor of Resolution 2743, which expands the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, in which it participates. Haiti was the People's Republic's first contribution to a UN peace initiative in the Western Hemisphere.

[3] Xinhua, July 25, 2024.