From Logistics Platform to Epicenter of Violence: Ecuador and Organized Crime

By Renato Rivera Rhon

English translation by Yenni Castro (Valestra Editorial)

Ecuador's involvement in transnational organized crime is a relatively recent phenomenon. Although since the 1990s the country has provided precursor chemicals for cocaine production in Colombia, unlike its neighboring countries, there had been no significant power struggles or a notable increase in violence between criminal organizations for dominance of drug trafficking routes. This led the country to be cataloged as an "island of peace". However, in early 2024, Ecuador attracted international attention due to the takeover of a television station by an Organized Criminal Group (OCG) and an increase in violence. As a result, in 2023 the country was considered the most violent in Latin America.

Against this backdrop, one question arises: what differentiates Ecuadorian organized crime from other cases in Latin America and why did violence escalate so rapidly? While there is no single explanation that encompasses all the structural and historical factors that have changed Ecuador's criminal landscape, evidence gathered from various press reports and academic contributions over the past five years suggests that at least three factors, both external and internal, have been determinant in Ecuador's rapid rise within the global economy of transnational organized crime. These factors are the Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the loss of legitimacy of the Sinaloa Cartel, and the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to a process of fragmentation of the criminal monopoly exercised by "Los Choneros."

First, the external factors that have increased Ecuador's relevance to transnational criminal organizations are linked to the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC. The signing of this agreement initiated a process of aggressive decentralization in cocaine production, which diversified global cocaine trafficking and introduced new actors, such as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and mafias of Balkan origin. As a result of the increase in cocaine production, Ecuador became more important as a logistical platform for cocaine trafficking, accounting for 70% of the international cocaine trade, according to United Nations data.

Second, the arrest and extradition of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán was interpreted by the CJNG as an opportunity to expand its influence and access to the cocaine business in southern Colombia and, by extension, Ecuador. One of the strategies of this OCG was to weaken the most powerful criminal organization in the country, "Los Choneros," who since 2003 had maintained a strategic alliance with the Sinaloa Cartel. After the weakening of the latter, the CJNG began to finance rival criminal groups, such as "Los Lagartos" and later "Los Lobos," in order to move cocaine through Ecuadorian ports. Simultaneously, the Balkan mafias, which initially supported "Los Choneros," began to operate independently, financing different groups and exacerbating competition between local criminal networks, leading to a significant increase in violence.

Third, Ecuador experienced a process of criminal fragmentation that was mainly evidenced by the prison massacres registered since 2018. "Los Choneros," who until then had monopolized criminal governance in the country through the control of detention centers and drug trafficking routes, saw their structure weakened due to the financing of local adversary organizations by transnational criminal groups. This process was compounded by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which affected the monopoly of "Los Choneros" by interrupting drug trafficking routes due to the global container crisis. Given that 80% of licit trade is transported by sea, the logistics crisis of 2020 and 2021 transformed Ecuador into a key cocaine storage hub for various transnational OCGs, all willing to finance local groups to ensure supply to international consumer markets.

As a result of these internal and external dynamics, the assassination of the leader of "Los Choneros" provoked a fragmentation that gave rise to new OCGs, such as "Los Lobos," "Tiguerones," and "Chone Killers," as well as the resurgence of other groups, such as "Latin Kings" and "Los Lagartos." All of them declared war against "Los Choneros" under the "New Generation" alliance, promoted by CJNG emissaries, which contributed to the accelerated increase in violence in the country. This process is reflected in the increase in intentional homicides, which went from 5.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2016 to 47 in 2023.

In this context, the state response since 2020 has been characterized by a reactive strategy based on penal populism and the militarization of internal security, based on the "iron fist" doctrine. This approach has configured a dichotomous securitization scheme in which the perception of security is obtained at the expense of human rights. It has also fostered a polarizing discourse that divides society into "good guys" and "bad guys" under the narrative of "narco-terrorism," which has legitimized the increase of executive power as the main response mechanism to criminality. Among the consequences of this policy are the recurrent implementation of states of exception, the toughening of penalties, the intervention of the Armed Forces in internal security matters, and the weakening of regional security cooperation strategies.

In the face of increasingly interconnected organized crime, sustained by alliances with criminal groups and corrupt actors within the state, the insistence on an “iron fist” as the predominant strategy seems to condemn Ecuador to failure in its fight against violence. By early 2025, despite a slight reduction in homicides in 2024, the OCGs have demonstrated their capacity to adapt to militarization, intensifying violence and deepening criminal fragmentation. Despite this, the state continues implementing reactive responses without structurally addressing the criminal dynamics that are perpetuating the crisis.

About the Author

Renato Rivera is a university professor and researcher in criminal governance and drug trafficking in Latin America. E-mail: renato.rivera89(at)gmail.com

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