Human rights in Latin America: challenges arising from an unfulfilled promise

By Guillermo Fernández-Maldonado

English translation by Yenni Castro (Valestra Editorial)

The severe deterioration of human rights due to violence and inequality is an evident fact in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Central America. Of the 50 most violent cities in the world, 45 are on our continent. As ECLAC points out, poverty remains unchanged from a decade ago (27.7%), with 1% of the population concentrating 33% of the wealth, and social protection being insufficient. The region stands out for its normative-institutional development of human rights, but also for its non-compliance. This explains why the States that approve treaties such as the Escazú Agreement - the first to protect environmental defenders - are the same ones where 85% of these defenders' murders are committed worldwide.[1]

After decades of democratic governments, the population feels that its expectations have been frustratingly unfulfilled due to inequality and a lack of protection from violence, abuse, and corruption by non-state actors and the state. Half do not support democracy, and the majority distrust political and corporate leaders[2]. 

Governments on both the left and right often blame their failures on their opponents or external factors, dismissing human rights criticisms. There is an offensive against human rights norms, the institutions that protect them, and the people who demand their respect. Those who want to silence their voices and prevent their actions -because they undermine their legal and illegal, political or economic interests- carry out aggressive campaigns and attacks on the institutional system. To discredit them, they claim that they have been "ideologized" and that they "favor criminals". Actors with resources and power are the ones who carry out the attacks, although they lack legitimacy, as is the case with the Peruvian government and parliament, with only 4% and 3% approval, respectively.[3]

Social protest is violently and indiscriminately repressed in violation of international standards (Chile, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela). Defenders, social leaders, and journalists have disappeared or have been murdered by criminal groups, state agents, and even companies (as in the Berta Cáceres case in Honduras).

A falsely dichotomous choice between security and respect for human rights is posed, as illustrated by a president in the region who stated that security must be prioritized over international dogmas. Human rights are thus presented as something foreign, utopian, and a luxury in times of crisis.

If rights such as access to health care, education, dignified work, security, or justice seem like privileges—since only a few enjoy them—it is because successive governments have failed to ensure that the state fulfills its obligations. These rights are not optional or foreign; they are constitutional mandates.

Weak institutionality

Impunity makes the right to truth and justice impossible. In many countries of the region, nine out of ten homicides go unclarified and unpunished due to the State's inability (not attributable to its respect for human rights). If we observe the performance of analogous institutions in other regions, such as Europe, it is evident that, despite problems and shortcomings, their high capacity and efficiency in combating crime go hand in hand with respect for human rights. The structural causes in the region are well known: a lack of professionalism, inadequate human, technical, and logistical resources, a lack of civil intelligence, widespread corruption, among other aspects. Addressing these causes requires time and resources, which governments  often allocate to unsustainable populist measures.

National human rights regulations and mechanisms lose their effectiveness in the face of such acts of non-compliance by the State. International protection systems—also accused of being ideologized or undermining sovereignty—are unable to provide an adequate response due to their limited powers and resources.

In a polarized context, fears are fueled, and the "iron fist" is offered as a solution. The poor performance of states and the spiral of criminal violence favor the acceptance of authoritarian options, at the expense of the rule of law and human rights.  This is occurring at a time of great uncertainty worldwide in the context of a crisis of multilateralism and human rights. Therefore, the defense of human rights—the minimum standard for all human beings, which the state has a fundamental duty to guarantee—is the defense of democracy and the rule of law.  

Today, authoritarianism is the greatest danger. The “iron fist” and militarization of security increase violence and impunity, as evidenced by the more than 100,000 people who have disappeared in Mexico since Felipe Calderón's government implemented it in 2006. Authoritarianisms have in common the militarization of security, criminalizing social protest, manipulating the law and the powers of the State to preserve power, persecuting opponents and critics, as well as limiting freedom of speech and the press.

A strong, professional, independent, and well-resourced state institutionality is required, one capable of progressively closing the inequality gap and ensuring the full enjoyment of rights. Designing a strategy to achieve this is a collective task that should address what was outlined by the late UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan: we will not enjoy development or security without respect for human rights.

To achieve this goal, a number of factors must be taken into account:

• Advocacy efforts should focus on those who have decision-making power over the issue, prioritizing problem areas and presenting them along with potential solutions. The goal is to persuade them to adopt viable and positive measures for change. Human rights methodologies and indicators are widely available. 
• Outreach and awareness-raising activities should be simple, educational and fact-based, featuring relatable and positive experiences that prioritize those who have been most excluded, and linking rights to their needs and demands.
• The reports and/or recommendations of country-specific protection mechanisms should be used proactively. Its innovative use should be promoted, for example, through confidential government consultations with special rapporteurs on how to address a crisis.
• Our actions should not be limited to criticism and denunciation. Less legally oriented and more multidisciplinary approaches are needed to participate with technical expertise at the planning and public policy levels. We must establish contact and identify potential allies across all sectors, including social, corporate, and political organizations.
• Local, regional, national, and international networks for promotion and protection should be created or strengthened. It is also necessary to promote at all levels the exchange of positive experiences, both from the State and society, to facilitate their replication.  

About the author

Guillermo Fernández-Maldonado Castro is a lawyer from the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Doctor of Law from the Universidad de Alcalá de Henares, and Master in Public Administration graduate from the National Institute of Public Administration, Spain. He was legal advisor to the Senate of Peru (1981-1991) and then worked as an international UN official on human rights matters in peace missions in El Salvador (1992-1994), Guatemala (1994-2004) and with the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Afghanistan (2004-2007), Ecuador (2007-2014), Colombia (2014-2020) and Mexico (2020-2023), as well as in Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay.

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[1] Global Witness Missing voices. The Violent Erasure of Land and Environmental Defenders.   September 2024. https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-and-environmental-defenders/missing-voices/

[2] Latinobarómetro Corporation.   Latinobarómetro 2024 Report: Resilient Democracy   https://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp?Idioma=0#latCarousel

[3]Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP) Informe de opinión de marzo 2025.  https://iep.org.pe/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/IEP-Informe-de-opinion-marzo-2025-informe-completo.pdf