Motion of the SPD Executive Committee 8 February 2026. Responses to Washington’s New World Order.

The transatlantic relationship as it has existed for decades is in a profound crisis. Recent US actions in Venezuela and the debate on Greenland demonstrate that, under President Trump, the United States is increasingly distancing itself from the rules-based international order that has long underpinned global co-operation. 
 

In line with its national security and defence strategies, the US administration is placing diminishing importance on international law. Longstanding alliances and partnerships are being called into question, while multilateral institutions are being marginalised. 
 

In their place, a worldview is emerging that emphasises the dominance of great powers within clearly defined spheres of influence. Rather than cooperation, US foreign policy is increasingly shaped by power politics, economic pressure and military strength in pursuit of short-term national interests. 
 

These developments raise serious concerns regarding the reliability of the United States as an international partner and ally. The current orientation of US foreign policy under President Trump, as well as the actions and communication of his Cabinet, are eroding the trust that has been built over many years within alliances, multilateral organisations and global initiatives. 
 

This trend contributes to growing uncertainty in the international system and undermines long-term predictability for states worldwide. It increases instability and heightens the risk of conflict. 

As a result, Europe and Germany face major challenges in three key areas: security policy, economic policy and domestic politics.

1) Security Policy Challenges 

From a security perspective, Europe is confronted with a dual challenge. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues, while key diplomatic initiatives concerning a possible end to the war are increasingly being conducted between the United States and Russia— without sufficient involvement of Europe or Ukraine. This marginalises European and Ukrainian interests. 

At the same time, uncertainty is growing regarding the future role of the United States in Europe. 

The debate over Washington’s reliability as NATO’s most important ally raises fundamental questions about its willingness to continue contributing comprehensively to Europe’s security vis-à-vis Russia, and about the future shape of a sustainable and stable European peace order. 

2) Economic Policy Challenges 

Europe is also facing mounting pressure in the field of economic policy. The European Union’s regulatory capacity and the size of its internal market constitute an independent source of influence in the global economic order. 

EU regulation, particularly in the digital sector, affects US business interests, prompting significant efforts by the US administration to weaken European rules governing digital platforms. At the same time, President Trump’s tariff policies are placing severe strain on European industry. 

European companies face the risk of being pushed out of the strategically important US market. 

3) Domestic Policy Challenges 

Europe’s liberal social and democratic model has become the focus of an ideological confrontation. The US administration explicitly frames this model as a security challenge that must be opposed. Legitimate debates on migration are deliberately exaggerated and polarised. Narratives of an alleged “civilisational decline” are being construed. 

The US administration is pursuing a vision of a Europe fragmented into nation states and is actively seeking to weaken the European Union by supporting EU-critical political forces across Europe. 

Against this backdrop, it is essential for Germany to undertake a realistic assessment of its relationship with the United States. Since the SPD’s last comprehensive foreign policy position from December 2023, the geopolitical environment has changed significantly. 

While relations with the United States under the Biden administration were grounded in a strong and shared commitment to common values, the conduct of President Trump’s administration has cast doubt on this reliability. Transatlantic relations can no longer be taken for granted. 

In response to these uncertainties, the SPD must develop new foreign policy approaches rooted in its core values, freedom, justice and solidarity, and work to strengthen Europe’s strategic autonomy. 

A Social Democratic Strategy for a Sovereign Europe 

Despite growing tensions, a rupture with the United States is not in Europe’s interest. Even where the priorities of the current US administration no longer align with European interests, the United States remains a key political, economic and security partner. 

Europe must therefore pursue a strategy of simultaneity: recognising existing mutual dependencies while resolutely strengthening its own security, independence and sovereignty. 

Previous approaches based on accommodation and de-escalation towards the Trump administration have failed to produce a genuinely co-operative partnership between Europa and Washington. 

The European Union must increasingly co-ordinate its internal decision-making independently of transatlantic processes. 

Strengthening the EU from within through institutional reform is essential if it is to act autonomously between the United States, China and other global powers. Europe must assert its values and interests with confidence, deepen co-operation with like-minded partners and position itself as an attractive hub of political and economic stability. In doing so, Europe can serve as a reliable anchor for other regions and states in an increasingly fragmented global order. 

Germany, in line with its economic and political weight, must assume a leadership role in positioning the EU as a strong and capable actor in the new world order. A free, secure and economically robust Europe is a core German interest. 

Europe must therefore combine effective crisis management with a clear ambition to shape outcomes. 

This includes Europeanising the security architecture, providing sustained strategic support to Ukraine, strengthening multilateral co-operation with the Global South and like-minded partners, defending democratic institutions against external interference, ensuring digital sovereignty through clear regulation and European platforms, and recalibrating transatlantic relations. 

While the current US administration has signaled its reluctance to engage with the EU as an equal counterpart, it remains clear that the EU is the sole negotiating partner for its member states in many policy areas. 

Our Responses to the Foreign Policy Course of the US Administration

1) Strengthening the European Security Architecture 

Europe will continue to rely on US capabilities in security and defense for the foreseeable future. Co-operation within NATO and a firm commitment to Article 5 remain essential pillars of European security. 

At the same time, it has long been evident that Europe must rapidly strengthen its own defense capabilities in order to reduce its vulnerability to political shifts in Washington. Strategic sovereignty in defense policy is indispensable. 

The exemption of defense expenditure from the German debt brake provides the fiscal space necessary to advance European initiatives. 

Germany can act as a catalyst for enhanced European co-operation, bringing together EU and non-EU partners such as the United Kingdom, Norway and Canada in joint capability development, procurement and research. Priority areas include satellite-based reconnaissance, navigation and command-and-control and communication capabilities. 

Closer integration of European defense policies and armed forces is essential to strengthening the European pillar within NATO. European states must assume greater operational and financial responsibility. To achieve this goal as quickly as possible, existing successful cooperation formats should be expanded, complemented by new instruments that can be institutionalised over time. 

The European Defense Agency plays a key role in co-ordinating procurement, harmonising capability planning and consolidating the European defence industry. 
A consistent “Buy European” approach — prioritising European systems and suppliers—will be critical to achieving strategic autonomy. Given the scale of required investment, common European financing instruments will be indispensable. 

Europe’s approach to security must be comprehensive. True resilience requires investment not only in military capabilities, but also in civil protection and robust civilian infrastructure, including transport networks, energy security and secure communication systems. 

2) Continuing Support for Ukraine 

Continued diplomatic, military, financial and humanitarian support for Ukraine remains essential and will be expanded as necessary to counter the costs imposed by Russia’s war of aggression. 

Supporting Ukraine is a centrepiece of a European security architecture and, at the same time, an opportunity to make European agency visible. The reconstruction of the Ukrainian economy must be jointly planned, driven forward, and designed. 

Any ceasefire cannot be imposed by Washington or Moscow. It must respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and Europe’s security interests. Peace negotiations cannot take place without Ukraine or without the European Union. Europe and Germany must actively shape diplomatic initiatives from a position of strength, including by appointing a European envoy to represent shared European interests vis-à-vis the United States and Russia. 

A just and sustainable peace with credible security guarantees serves not only European interests, but also those of the United States. It is the responsibility of Europe and Germany to make a substantial contribution. Ukraine’s path towards EU membership remains a strategic objective and must be supported through concrete steps. 

3) Building New Partnerships 

The partial withdrawal of the United States from international fora weakens the rules-based international order. Europe must respond by shaping a renewed multilateralism together with its partners. This “Multilateralism 2.0” should emphasise co-operation, dialogue and rules based solutions. 

Flexible, issue-specific partnerships with trusted partners—such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand—as well as key actors in the Global South and the democratic BRICS countries including India, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa, are essential. 

Together, reforms of international institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the IMF can be advanced, alongside joint initiatives on global justice, tax policy, debt management and sustainable development.

Development co-operation remains a central pillar of European soft power. European programmes must be better co-ordinated and more focused in order to strengthen equitable partnerships in the Global South. Europe’s approach is distinguished by fair standards, technology transfer and respect for labour rights. This renewed orientation enables Europe to act confidently as a shaping force in the twenty-first century—values-based, pragmatic and committed to partnership. 

4) Strengthening Europe’s Economic Sovereignty and Strategic Autonomy 

Europe must position itself as a central political and economic partner for other regions. This requires harnessing the full potential of the EU’s economic strength and international interconnectedness through a more deeply integrated internal market with uniform European standards and strong internal demand. The "Buy European" approach is Europe’s answer to the fact that other states are no longer playing by the rules. By prioritizing the use of European products in public procurement and defined proportions of European inputs, the EU provides targeted demand impulses and strengthens its strategic autonomy. 

This promotes innovation, increases resilience to protectionist or highly subsidized economic areas, and reduces dependencies on third countries. 

Competitiveness depends on secure, affordable and resilient energy and raw-material supplies. Europe must expand non-fossil domestic energy sources and develop new, partnership-based energy co-operation with countries in the Global South—without creating new dependencies. 

Resilient supply chains for critical raw materials, semiconductors and battery components, along with strategic reserves, recycling targets and expanded mining capabilities within Europe, are essential. 

Food security has become a geopolitical issue, making European agriculture a strategic sector that must be strengthened. 

Sustainable management and diversified supply chains can cushion external shocks. These foundations form the core of European strategic autonomy. 
To enhance its geopolitical capacity, the EU must pursue a more strategic trade policy.  More flexible and topic-related agreements should be concluded faster, especially with partners in the Global South, particularly in Africa. 

Strengthening the international role of the euro in trade, payments and as a reserve currency is a key lever of European sovereignty. This requires completing the banking and capital markets union, advancing the digital euro and enabling all EU member states to join the monetary union. Europe must also reinforce its role as a Safe Haven for investment. 

A comprehensive research and innovation agenda is essential to securing Europe’s long-term competitiveness. In strategic fields such as 6G networks, artificial intelligence, cloud services, data centres, semiconductors, climate technologies, and the financial and health sectors, Europe must achieve technological leadership and translate excellence in research into marketready applications. 

This includes an industrial policy that enables the development of European champions in strategic sectors. Building on existing strengths, for example in cloud services and enterprise software, coordinated public procurement and purchasing processes as well as common standards can be deployed strategically to strengthen European providers and ensure their global competitiveness. 

For this technological agenda, significant investments are required that cannot be covered by national budgets or the existing EU budget alone. Therefore, joint European financing instruments and new own resources are needed. 

Progress in European sovereignty must not fail due to the blockade of individual member states. 

Europe must speak with one voice. To remain capable of action, institutional adjustments are required. Europe needs an open debate on further transfers of sovereignty from the Member States to the European level, alongside a strengthening of its democratic structures—such as expanding majority voting in the Council and enhancing the role of the European Parliament, including the introduction of a right of legislative initiative. At the same time, the existing possibilities within the EU Treaties must be used consistently and to their full extent. Considering current geopolitical challenges, Europe requires a model of differentiated integration. 
Together with other willing states, Germany can take the lead through enhanced co-operation under Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union, thereby enabling concrete steps towards greater European sovereignty. 

This form of co-operation remains open to all Member States. 

5) Strengthening Democratic Resilience 

The announced support by the US administration for right-wing populist forces in Europe constitutes a direct challenge to European sovereignty and democratic integrity. Europe must respond by visibly strengthening democratic resilience. Interference in elections, political financing or territorial integrity must be clearly identified as red lines and met with firm resistance. 

Protecting the liberal democratic order requires strong and independent judicial institutions, effective intelligence and security services, greater public awareness of democratic threats, transparency in party financing and comprehensive prevention of disinformation—particularly for vulnerable groups. Children and young people require special protection in the digital space. Platforms must be held accountable for removing harmful content, and media literacy must be firmly embedded in school curricula. Democracy support programmes must be strengthened to ensure stability despite changing political majorities. We need to protect fundamental values such as freedom of expression, the protection of minorities and tolerance. European democracy must become more resilient. 

6) Ensuring Digital Sovereignty

 
Europe can leverage its market of 450 million consumers to set global digital standards. This includes stricter enforcement of competition and media law, the labelling of bots and AIgenerated content, and enhanced transparency requirements to expose covert influence. Regulation must be matched by effective enforcement. The Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act and the Audiovisual Media Services Directive form the legal backbone of Europe’s digital sovereignty and must be applied consistently.

Global technology companies must comply with European rules. 

At the same time, Europe must invest decisively in European digital platforms to protect the public sphere from external influence. European alternatives to existing social networks are a key component of digital sovereignty and should be supported through targeted funding and clear standards. A digital tax on global platforms can further promote fair competition and curb their excessive market power. 

7) Re-calibrating Transatlantic Relations 

The US administration’s departure from a rules-based international order is a reality to which Europe must respond without abandoning the transatlantic partnership. The United States is more than any single administration and will remain a key partner. Europe must pursue a strategy of simultaneity: acknowledging ongoing dependencies while advancing European sovereignty and maintaining a minimum level of security co-operation. 
This requires strengthening ties not only with the current US administration, but also with moderate Republicans and Democrats, state and local actors, think tanks, universities and businesses. The aim is to build a dense network of political and societal relationships that endures beyond electoral cycles. Foreseeable domestic political conflicts in the United States over democracy, social policy and economic policy make it clear that Europe must continue to invest in dialogue with its US partners. 

For the SPD, it remains clear: the United States is not our adversary. The values that have defined transatlantic relations, a rules-based international order, shared security, democracy, freedom, economic co-operation and the universality of human rights, remain the foundation of our policies and politics. 

We will continue to pursue this path together with our like-minded partners and the United States.