What can we expect from the Trump 2.0 administration’s policies towards Latin America

By Maureen Meyer

Donald Trump’s first term as U.S. president (2017-2021) revealed his penchant for a transactional foreign policy and little moral standing or interest in uplifting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law globally. In Latin America, his contempt for checks and balances, politicization of judicial institutions, and attacks on the press emboldened governments with authoritarian tendencies to dismantle key anti-corruption and good governance efforts. 

Amid global crises like the wars in Ukraine and Israel-Gaza, and the goal of countering China, it is not clear how much Latin America will be a foreign policy priority of the Trump 2.0 administration. However, campaign promises related to migration and drug trafficking will likely put Latin America at the center of several policy discussions and actions. The nomination of Senator Marco Rubio as U.S. Secretary of State will place a Cuban American with knowledge and interest in Latin America at the helm of U.S. diplomacy. 

Trump and Rubio have allies and strong ties to leaders with authoritarian and populist tendencies in Latin America, such as Argentinian president Javier Milei - the first foreign leader to meet with Trump after the election - Salvadoran president Nayib Bukele, former Guatemalan president Alejandro Giammatttei, and former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro and his family, including his son Eduardo who was at Trump’s watch party in Mar-a-Lago elections night. Although the administration will likely take a strong stance against the authoritarian governments in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, we can expect it to forge an alliance with conservative governments and opposition leaders in Latin America that hold similar views on restricting access to abortion, curtailing support for diversity and the protection of vulnerable groups and weakening institutional checks on their power.

Trump’s transactional nature and focus on migration and drug trafficking, apart from trade and tariffs, will not be new for Latin American governments. However, some of his more extreme proposals, such as military intervention in Mexico to address drug trafficking, have gained more traction within the Republican party. We can anticipate a strong law enforcement and military response to curb the production and trafficking of illicit drugs from the region. Apart from pressure and threats of tariffs on Mexico due to fentanyl production and trafficking, Colombia may also be in the spotlight, even at risk of being “decertified” for failing to cooperate sufficiently in the drug war, given record coca production since 2020.

While Trump’s first term was focused on building the border wall, his second term appears to be on the mass deportation of undocumented migrants living in the U.S. and the rollback of temporary legal pathways for other migrants put in place or expanded under the Biden administration. Although funding and logistical hurdles may limit the extent of deportations, Mexico and other countries in Latin America, which as a region accounts for approximately 7.87 million of the estimated 11 million  undocumented migrants in the country - and the majority of the beneficiaries of numerous other temporary legal status programs -  will need to prepare to receive a high number of deportees and for the economic impact from reduced remittances.  Latin American countries, including but not limited to Mexico and Central America, should also expect to see a renewed pressure to close their own borders, reach asylum cooperation agreements, and dramatically reduce the number of migrants reaching the U.S.-Mexico border, in order to avoid economic repercussions such as tariffs or suspensions to U.S. assistance, as was the case with aid to Central America during part of Trump’s first term.

With a Republican majority in Congress, Trump is likely to secure the support and funding needed to carry out his restrictive immigration agenda. Republicans had previously passed legislation in the House of Representatives that would further curtail access to asylum, reinstate the “Remain in Mexico” program and “safe third country” agreements to receive asylum seekers, while seeking to condition U.S. foreign assistance on regional immigration enforcement. 

However, Trump may face more headwinds in reducing and reshaping parts of foreign aid.  During his first term, Congress, including when the Republicans were in the majority in both chambers, rejected proposed cuts to many programs.  In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. assistance between 2018-2021 ranged from $1.67 billion to $1.8 billion each year, on par with previous years although the focus of some categories of assistance and countries shifted.  Congress also resisted Trump’s proposal to eliminate the Inter-American Development Foundation, although the Republican controlled House has sought to reduce by half its funding in recent years, and Congress has maintained support for the Organization of American States.

Nevertheless, with Trump as president and a Republican-controlled Congress for at least the next two years, there will be a realignment of priority areas of U.S. assistance, if not substantial reductions, with ideological views increasingly influencing U.S. funding allocations. Already Republicans have sought to eliminate or dramatically reduce U.S. assistance to Colombia under the Petro administration and withhold economic assistance to countries who hire Cuban doctors. The version of the 2025 foreign aid bill approved by the Republican-controlled House would remove U.S. contributions to the Inter-American Development Bank, referencing the role of China in the IDB.

Globally, U.S. foreign aid priorities of Republicans currently leading foreign assistance legislation in the House clearly show that Trump will face no resistance in eliminating global funding to address the climate crisis, dramatically reducing or ending funding for the UN and other international agencies, including the World Health Organization, while prioritizing resources to counter China and bolster security assistance, including for border security and addressing the flow of illicit drugs into the country.  

Civil society organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, and worldwide, who support human rights, anti-corruption efforts, judicial independence, diversity, gender equality, reproductive rights, and the environment, will find fewer friends in leadership positions in the administration and Congress. Reduced U.S. funding and support for these efforts will come at an increasingly perilous time for organizations in the region who have experienced a decrease in assistance for human rights from the philanthropic community and reductions in funding from European governments who have also dramatically cut foreign assistance in recent years.

To navigate a path forward, civil society organizations should evaluate their advocacy strategies and adapt to the current landscape of disinformation, the expansion of social media, and a growing number of governments with authoritarian tendencies worldwide who work off the same playbook. Strengthened alliances and coordination between organizations in Latin America, the U.S., and Europe will be essential to defending past gains and resisting further erosion of democratic norms and the rule of law.

About the Author

Maureen Meyer is Vice President for Programs at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). Prior to assuming this position in 2020, she spent 14 years directing WOLA's Mexico program and WOLA's work on human rights and democracy in Central America. Meyer previously lived and worked for five years in Mexico City, primarily with the Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Center. She holds an MA in International Development from American University and a BA in Spanish and Anthropology from the University of Arizona.

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